ABSTRACT We study a single-period supply chain system under the wholesale price contract. It is well known that the system cannot be coordinated via the wholesale price contract. In this paper, by employing the power-dependence theory raised by Emerson (1962) , we propose a power-balanced Pareto-improvement solution for this system. We consider two representative scenarios: 1) the supply chain being a bilateral monopoly and 2) the supply chain consisting of a single supplier and two non-competing retailers. For both scenarios, we demonstrate analytically and numerically that there exists a unique power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium, at which system coordination is achieved. We also show that the power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, enormous literature on supply chain have studied various contracts, such as the wholesale price, buy back, revenue sharing, quantity flexibility, sales rebate, twopart tariff, and quantity discount contracts [1] - [4] . Among these contracts, the wholesale price contract is nearly always found to be inefficient for system coordination (i.e., double marginalization). Whereas, other more sophisticated contracts could eliminate the inefficiency and yield system coordination results; see [3] - [5] and the reference therein. The reason that the wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain system lies in that the wholesale price cannot be greater than the procurement cost of the supplier in order to coordinate the system, which, however, is not acceptable for the supplier. Nevertheless, owing to its simplicity and ease of implementation, the wholesale price contract is still one of the most prevalently applied supply chain contracts in reality.
Since the wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain system, the corresponding profit of the system is always lower than the optimal profit of the integrated system. Thus, there remains space for the supply chain to make Pareto-improvement, that is, all members in the system
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are no worse off while at least one of them is better off. In this paper, we aim to propose a Pareto-improvement scheme for the supply chain system.
Our Pareto-improvement scheme is built upon the power theory, which originates from the social and political areas. Recently, researchers have become aware of that profit allocation of a supply chain system has a lot to do with the relative bargaining power of the system participants [4] , [6] - [9] . Specifically, in a supply chain, every firm can be assumed to have a reservation profit level and accept only a contract that yields the reservation level; the higher the reservation level, the higher the firm's power. Based on the reservation profit level, [8] discussed the bargaining problem of the supply chain system. Reference [6] discussed the supply chain performance when the retailers in the supply chain have a bargaining power corresponding to their ability to set the reservation profit levels. Reference [7] presented a general framework for negotiations in a supply chain and applied the framework to the decentralized assembly bargaining problem. In these works, however, power is still an abstract term that is easy to understand but hard to quantify [4] . Mathematical characterization of the impact of power on the profit allocation of the supply chain system remains open.
In this paper, we propose to bring power into the supply chain contract research, with an aim of addressing the profit allocation problem in the power-impacted supply chain. We first consider a bilateral monopoly supply chain system consisting of one supplier and one retailer. As mentioned, this system cannot be coordinated with the wholesale price contract, and hence there exists space for making the Pareto-improvement. To the end, we employ the powerdependence theory [10] , where the key idea lies in that power resides implicitly in the other's dependency; thus, the system is balanced whenever the power of each member in the system equals. Indeed, analytical results show that there exists a unique power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium for the system, upon which no further Pareto-improvement can be made. Assuming that all system members are risk neutral and profit seeking, the Pareto-equilibrium solution is welcomed as it allows all members in the supply chain to obtain possibly better profits than that in the decentralized case. Interestingly, our analysis also demonstrates that the unique Pareto-equilibrium is precisely a Nash-equilibrium of the system, at which the supply chain is coordinated.
We also extend the study to a more practical scenario, in which a single supplier offers identical products to two non-competing retailers under the wholesale price contract. Our analysis reveals that this system cannot be coordinated, while Pareto-improvement is still possible by applying the power-dependent theory. In particular, this system has a unique optimal power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium, which can also be proved to be a Nash equilibrium. In addition, we demonstrate that the system coordination is reached at the power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium status.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows. i) We novelly introduce the power-dependence theory into the supply chain profit allocation research. By doing so, we can quantitatively analyze the profit allocation of the supply chain under a power-balanced condition. Our research is thus a supplement to the study of power-impacted supply chain. ii) By employing the power-dependence theory, we give a unique power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium solution to the supply chain system with the wholesale price contract. The Pareto-equilibrium solution allows all members in the supply chain system to obtain possibly better profits than under solely the wholesale price contract, and thus is welcomed by all entities. iii) We show analytically that the power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium of the supply chain system is precisely a Nash equilibrium, which means that the system is power-balanced and all the members in the supply chain has no incentive to deviate from the balance. The rest of paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we review some literature on the power theory and briefly describe how to apply the power-dependence theory to the supply chain contract research. Section III proposes the power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium scheme for a bilateral monopoly supply chain under the wholesale price contract. Section IV extends the research to a supply chain with a single supplier and two non-competing retailers, and derives the power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium solutions for this system. Section V presents numerical experiments and Section VI concludes our work.
II. POWER THEORY AND SUPPLY CHAIN A. LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE POWER THEORY
Power, also called the bargaining or negotiation power, is an abstract word in many scenarios. We often hear sentences like ''A has power'' and ''the power of A is greater than that of B''. So far, however, there is still no agreement as to the definition of power, despite the considerable number of studies on power, both in theory and practice. The power research rooted largely in the social and political areas and there have been plenty of literature on power by economists, sociologists and political scientists. By digging into the measurement of power, [11] specified three branches of the power literature. Following the classification. we review some power-related literature below.
The first branch is the power resources theory. Reference [12] defined power as the ability to influence others, and the magnitude of the power source can be employed as an index of influence. Reference [13] classified six power sources of Reward, Coercive, Expert, Referent, Legitimate and Legal Legitimate. Reference [14] applied this power sources theory to study the power influence in the supply chain integration.
The second branch is the power-control theory. The definition of power, raised by [15] , is the ability of an individual or group to prompt another unit to do what her/his would not have otherwise done. Power could be estimated by measuring the amount of change induced in the actions of others. From a marketing point of view, [11] defined power of a channel member as her/his ability to control the decision variables in the marketing strategy of another member in a given channel at a different level of a distribution.
The third branch is the power-dependence theory initially developed by [10] . There, it is claimed that power resides implicitly in the other's dependency. According to Emerson [10] , the dependence D ab of actor A upon actor B is directly proportional to A's motivational investment in goals mediated by B, and inversely proportional to the availability of those goals to A outside of the A-B relation. The power P ab of actor A over actor B is the amount of resistance on the part of B which can be potentially overcome by A. The fundamental relationship between power and dependence is P ab = D ba . When D ab = D ba , the relationship between actor A and actor B reaches a balanced point. Otherwise, the relationship between these two actors is not stable and there would be a trend towards the balancing status. After its introduction, the power-dependence theory has received much attention in many fields, especially the social exchange networks. References [16] - [19] applied the powerdependence theory to exchange networks. Reference [20] further presented a power-dependence formulation of the exchange networks. 
B. THE NEGOTIATION POWER IN SUPPLY CHAIN
The power-dependence theory and the developed social exchange theory can also be employed to study supply chain systems [21] - [23] . According to the power-dependence theory [10] , [16] , [19] , [20] , the power P ab of actor A over actor B can be expressed by the dependence D ba of actor B upon actor A. In addition, D ab is determined by the difference between the value that actor A could get from actor B and the value that actor A could gain from its best available alternative. The relationship between actors A and B is not balanced unless either of the conditions
holds. When applied to supply chain, assuming that a retailer R is a supplier S's preferred partner, the dependence of S on R is the difference between the profit that S could obtain from R and the reservation profit level of S. A player won't take an offer which yields a profit below her/his reservation profit level.
It's important to note that the reservation profit level varies during the negotiation process. Note also that, under a wholesale price contract, a supply chain system profit is a variable determined by the wholesale price and the order quantity. With the power-dependence theory, we shall show that there is a unique power-balanced point, while other unbalanced profit allocations will approach to the power-balanced point.
III. THE POWER-BALANCED PARETO-EQUILIBRIUM UNDER BILATERAL MONOPOLY CONDITION
In this section, we consider the power-balanced Paretoimproved solution for a single-period bilateral monopoly supply chain under the wholesale price contract facing a random demand. In this supply chain, the wholesaler acquires products at unit cost c s and delivers them to the retailer at unit wholesale price w. The retailer ordersuantities from the wholesaler and sells them at a fixed unit retail price p to the customers. The retailer has a unit transportation cost c r . Let c be the sum of c s and c r (c = c s +c r < p). The unsold products at the end of the selling season can be disposed with v per unit (v < c). For simplicity, we assume that the unsatisfied demand carries no penalty cost.
Let D be the random demand during the selling season. We assume that the random demand has a cumulative distribution function F(·) and a probability density function f (·), where F(·) is differentiable, strictly increasing with inverse cumulative distribution function F −1 (·) and F(0) = 0; f (·) is also continuous and differentiable. Moreover, we assume D to be nonnegative and supported on [0, K ] where K > 0.
Let S(q) and I (q) be the expected sales quantity and the expected leftovers, respectively. Then we have
and
The expected profits of the supplier and the retailer are expressed, respectively, as
Also, the integrated supply chain's expected profit is given by
In [4] , Cachon revealed the following findings about a bilateral monopoly supply chain with the wholesale price contract, which are useful for our analysis.
i) The integrated supply chain system's profit function is strictly concave. Thus, the system has an optimal order quantity q o to induce the optimal system profit o . ii) Under the wholesale price contract, with increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR) demand distributions, the supplier's profit function is concave. The supplier has a unique optimal order quantity q * w and a unique optimal wholesale price
Hence, the supplier has an optimal profit π * wS . iii) With a given wholesale price, the retailer's profit function is also concave in the order quantity. With the wholesale price w * w , the retailer has a unique optimal order quantity q * w , and thus an optimal profit π * wR . iv) The supplier's wholesale price w and the retailer's order quantity are one-to-one mapping with
Thus, the retailer's profit can be rewritten as
which is monotone increasing with the order quantity q. v) The wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain because the condition of coordination q * w = q o can only be achieved when w = c s , which is unacceptable for the supplier since the supplier would obtain zero profit. In this paper, we also consider the IGFR demand distributions. It is worth mentioning that IGFR is a very mild restriction since many of the commonly applied demand distributions are IGFR (e.g., the uniform, normal, exponential, Weibull, gamma and power distribution). Since the wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain, the system's profit is not maximized. Thus, the supply chain has chances to make Pareto-improvement, that is, both the supplier and the retailer are no worse off and at least one of them is better off.
We employ the power-dependence theory introduced by Emerson [10] in order to make Pareto-improvement.
According to this theory, the dependence of the supplier S upon the retailer R, denoted as D SR , is functioned as the difference between the value that S could get from R and the supplier S's reservation profit level, vice versa. In addition, when D SR = D RS , the power balance is obtained.
For this system, the supplier and retailer have the reservation profit level of π * wS and π * wR , respectively. Let π pS and π pR be the Pareto-improved profit of the supplier and the retailer, respectively. Let * w = π * wS + π * wR and p = π pS + π pR be the optimal system profit under the wholesale price contract and the Pareto-improved system profit, respectively. From the definition of Pareto-improvement, we have
Let π * pS and π * pR be the Pareto-optimal profit of the supplier and the retailer, respectively, in the Pareto-equilibrium condition. Then, with the power-dependence theory, we have the following result.
Claim 1 (Power-Balanced Pareto-Equilibrium): With the wholesale price contract, the bilateral monopoly supply chain has a unique power-balanced Pareto-Equilibrium point with
Moreover, the system coordination is obtained when the power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium is reached. Proof: According to the power-dependence theory, in this bilateral supply chain system, the dependence of supplier S upon retailer R is given as
Inversely, the dependence of retailer R upon supplier S can be given by
Under the power balance condition, i.e., D SR = D RS , and the fact that p = π pS + π pR , we can obtain the profit allocation
Since p > * w = π * wS + π * wR , we have π pS > π * wS and π pR > π * wR . In addition, we know that p is upper bounded by the system optimal profit o , so the optimal value of π pS is obtained as
Similarly, we have
Thus, we come to a conclusion that there are a unique π * pS and a unique π * pR . Moreover, since π * pS + π * pR = o , the supply chain is coordinated when the power-balanced Paretoequilibrium is obtained. This completes the proof. Proof: According to the cooperative bargaining theory introduced by Nash [24] , the optimal bargaining payment scheme is equivalent to solving the following problem:
where π NS and π NR are the Nash-equilibrium Paretoimproved profit of the supplier and the retailer, respectively. The solution of the above problem (P) is the 
Since π * NS = π * pS and π * NR = π * pR , we reach the conclusion that the power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium of the supply chain is a Nash equilibrium.
IV. THE POWER-BALANCED PARETO-EQUILIBRIUM IN A SUPPLY CHAIN WITH MULTIPLE MEMBERS
In this section, we extend our research by considering the power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium solution for a singleperiod supply chain system with a single supplier and two retailers. This system is commonly observed in realistic. For example, two convenience stores procure the products from the same wholesaler.
With wholesale price contract, each retailer decides the order quantity q i at the start of the selling season. The supplier procures the products at a per-unit costĉ s and charges both retailers with the same per-unit wholesale priceŵ. The supplier is assumed to have ample capacity to satisfy both the retailers' orders. Each retailer has a unit transportation cost c r i , i = 1, 2. Let c i =ĉ s + c r i (c i < p i ). The retail price at each retailer p i is exogenously determined with a fixed value. The unmet demand is lost and carries no penalty cost, while each unsold product at the retailer can be salvaged at a per-unit salvage rate v i .
Let D i be the random demand faced by the retailer R i during the selling season. We assume that D i has a cumulative distribution function F i (·) and a probability density function f i (·), where F i (·) is differentiable, strictly increasing with an inverse cumulative distribution function F Let S(q i ) and I (q i ) be the expected sales quantity and the expected leftovers at the retailer R i , respectively. Then, we have
Thus, the profit functions of the supplier and the retailer R i can be given, respectively, bŷ
The whole supply chain's profit function is then expressed aŝ
The first and second derivation of the system profit function with respect to q i (i = 1, 2) are
respectively. In addition, the second derivation with respect to q 1 and q 2 is
Therefore, the Hessian matrix of the system profit function (q 1 , q 2 ) with respect to q 1 and q 2 is negative definite. Thus, the system profit function is jointly concave in (q 1 , q 2 ), with a unique optimal joint decision (q o 1 , q o 2 ) satisfying the conditions
The retailer R i 's profit function is also strictly concave in q i . The retailer R i has an optimal order quantity q * i , obeying
The whole system can be coordinated only when
. By comparing the retailers' optimal order quantity (q * 1 , q * 2 ) and the whole system's optimal order quantity (q o 1 , q o 2 ), one can see that (q * 1 , q * 2 ) = (q o 1 , q o 2 ) holds only whenŵ =ĉ s , since F i (q i ) is strictly increasing. This condition is hardly satisfied because it leaves the supplier with zero profit. Thus, this supply chain cannot be coordinated with wholesale price contract. That is, the system's profit under wholesale price contract should be lower than the system's optimal profit. Thus, there may exist chances for us to make Paretoimprovement for the supply chain system. In this section, we utilize the power-dependence theory again to make the Pareto-improvement. First, we need to find the reservation profit level, i.e., the optimal profit under the wholesale price contract for each player of this supply chain.
Claim 6: With IGFR demand distributions, the supplier and the two retailers all have unique optimal profits under the wholesale price contract.
Proof: From equation (19), we know that the wholesale priceŵ can be expressed as a function of the retailer R i 's optimal order quantity q * i :
Since F i (q i ) is monotone increasing and continuous, there exists a one-to-one mapping betweenŵ and q * i . Thus, the supplier's profit function can be rewritten aŝ
where
The supplier's optimal profit can be obtained by solving the following problem:
where the constraint comes from the condition that both the retailers acquire the products with the same wholesale price and equation (19) .
In [4] , Cachon has indicated that π S i is concave when the demand D i follows the IGFR distribution. Here, we also consider the IGFR distributions and in this case, both π S 1 and π S 2 are concave. Therefore,π S (q 1 , q 2 ) is jointly concave in (q 1 , q 2 ).
With the constraint in problem (P 1 ), the order quantity q 1 can be expressed as an equation of q 2 :
Since F i (q i ) is monotone increasing with q i (i = 1, 2), q 1 is increasing with q 2 . Vice versa.
Combining the above two facts, problem (P 1 ) has a unique optimal solution, denoted asπ * wS . The unique optimal order quantity that inducesπ * wS is denoted as (q * w1 , q * w2 ). Then, we have the supplier's optimal wholesale pricê
With the unique optimal wholesale priceŵ * w and the unique optimal order quantity (q * w1 , q * w2 ), we have the retailer R i 's optimal profit π * wR i , i = 1, 2, under the wholesale price contract.
Now that we have all the supply chain member's reservation profit level, we investigate the power-balanced Paretoimproved solution for this system. Let π pS i be the supplier's Pareto-improved profit obtained from the business with the retailer R i and π pR i be the Pareto-improved profit of the retailer R i . Letπ pS = π pS 1 + π pS 2 , pi = π pS i + π pR i , and p = p1 + p2 . Then, according to the power-dependence theory, the dependence of the retailer R i on the supplier S is
and the dependence of the supplier S on the retailer R i is
where π * wS i = (ŵ * w −ĉ s )q * wi , which is the supplier's optimal decentralized profit from the business with the retailer R i under the wholesale price contract. With the power balance condition, i.e., D R i S = D SR i , and the fact that pi = π pS i + π pR i , we can obtain the power-balanced Pareto-improved profit allocation:
Sinceπ
, we have the supplier's power-balanced Pareto-improved profit
Thus, the remaining task is to find the optimal values of p1 , p2 andˆ p , respectively. We first investigate the optimal value ofˆ p .
Claim 7: The optimal value of the power-balanced Pareto-improved system profitˆ * p equals the system's optimal profitˆ o .
Proof: The optimal value ofˆ p is obtained by solving the following problem:
where the constraint comes from the condition that both the retailers acquire the products with the same wholesale price.
We have known from the previous analysis that the optimal profit of the supply chain system isˆ o with a unique optimal joint decision (q o 1 , q o 2 ). In addition, when the order quantity
In other words, the system optimal order quantity decision (q o 1 , q o 2 ) satisfies the constraint in problem (P 2 ).
Thus, we come to the conclusion that problem (P 2 ) has a unique optimal solution, denoted asˆ 
Then, we have the following claim:
Claim 9: Under the wholesale price contact, the supply chain system with a single supplier and two noncompeting retailers has a unique optimal power-balanced Paretoequilibrium solution with 
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT
In this section, we perform numerical experiments to investigate the implications of the power-balanced Paretoimprovement. Our main goals are i) to exemplify the earlier theoretical results, and ii) to measure the impacts of various parameter changes on the profit allocation of the supply chain system. The managerial insights gained from the study can serve for practical purposes.
Our experiment is performed with the system consisting a single supplier and two noncompeting retailers. In our experiment, the values of the problem parameters are arbitrarily chosen solely for illustrative purpose: The supplier's unit procurement costĉ s = 3; The unit transportation cost of the retailer R 1 and the retailer R 2 are c r 1 = 2 and c r 2 = 2.5, respectively; The unit salvage rate at both the retailers are v 1 = v 2 = 1. Since the demand faced by the retailers is assumed to follow the IFGR distribution, we consider uniform distributions here. i) the integrated system; ii) the decentralized system; iii) and the power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium. Our numerical results are displayed in Table 1 . For easy tracking, the variables under-investigated are summarized as follows.
•ˆ o : the system optimal profit in the integrated case and in the power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium case;
•ˆ * w : the decentralized system optimal profit; • {π * wR i } i=1,2 : R i 's optimal profit in the decentralized case; 2 : R i 's optimal profit at the power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium status;
: R i 's optimal order quantity in the integrated case and in the power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium case;
• {q * wR i } i=1,2 : R i 's optimal order quantity in the decentralized case;
•ŵ * w : S's optimal wholesale price in the decentralized case;
•ŵ * p : S's optimal wholesale price at the power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium status;
•π * wS : S's optimal profit in the decentralized case;
•π * pS : S's optimal profit at the power-balanced Paretoequilibrium status; By comparing the decision of the integrated system and that of the decentralized system under wholesale price contract in Table 1 , we observe that each decentralized retailer always set a lower order quantity, that is, q * wR i < q o i , i = 1, 2. We also observe that the decentralized system profit is lower than the system optimal profit, i.e.,ˆ * w <ˆ o . This validates the claim that the decentralized system cannot be coordinated. Moreover, by comparing the power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium solution with the decentralized system solution, we found that the supplier and two retailers are all better off under the power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium status; that is,π * pS >π * wS and π * pR i > π * wR i
, i = 1, 2. We also found that, under the power-balanced Paretoequilibrium status, the wholesale price is always lower than that of the decentralized case; i.e.,ŵ * p <ŵ * w in each row. VOLUME 7, 2019 TABLE 1. The optimal solutions of a supply chain system with a single supplier and two noncompeting retailers;ĉ s = 3, c r 1 = 2, c r 2 = 2.5,
We investigate the impact of the demand support on the optimal solutions of each supply chain member under each scenario. With certain retail prices q 1 and q 2 , and a constant demand support of D 1 , In all decrease with the support size of demand D 2 . This implies that the retailer R 2 , the supplier, and the system all benefit from the increasing support size of D 2 for all the three cases (i.e., the integrated, the decentralized, and the powerbalanced Pareto-equilibrium case), while the retailer R 1 gets worse performance. The results well match with our intuition that a higher demand usually leads to a better profit.
We also investigate the impact of retail price on the performance of each member in the supply chain in each case. By fixing both the demand supports and the retailer R 1 's retail price, we observe in this particular example that with the increase of the retailer R 2 's retail price p 2 , the retailer R 2 , the supplier, and the system all benefit in the three cases (i.e., the integrated system, the decentralized system and the power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium status), while the retailer R 1 get worse performance. , and π * pR 1 all decrease with the retail price p 2 . The results indicate that, with the same demand, the higher retail price leads to the better profit.
Finally, we examine the supplier's profit share in the supply chain system in the decentralized case and in powerbalanced Pareto-equilibrium status, denoted asπ * wŜ π * w andπ * pŜ π o , respectively. We found in this particular experiment that in both cases, the supplier's profit share is more than 60%, which means that the supplier takes most of the system profit. We also found that in both cases, the supplier's profit share increases with the support of demand D 2 . However, with the increase of retail price p 2 , the supplier's profit share in both cases decreases. The results indicate that the supplier can take advantages from the demand support difference between the two retailers when the retail prices are fixed -the bigger the difference is, the more advantages are. Whereas, with the fixed demand supports, the rise of a retailer's retail price would harm the supplier's advantage.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Wholesale price contract is one of the most prevalent contracts in the real world, mainly due to its simplicity and ease of implementation. A well-known drawback of this contract is that it cannot coordinate the supply chain for most circumstances. In this paper, we novelly employed the powerdependence theory to the supply chain contract research, and studied the Pareto-improved profit allocation problem in a single-period supply chain system under the wholesale price contract. We considered a bilateral monopoly supply chain as well as a system with a single supplier and two noncompeting retailers. For each case, we proposed a power-balanced Pareto-improvement scheme, and showed that there existed a unique power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium, under which coordination is achieved for the system. We also proved that the proposed unique power-balanced Pareto-equilibrium is essentially a Nash-equilibrium.
We would like to mention that although our analysis focuses on a supply chain system with one or two noncompeting retailers only, it can possibly be extended to the more general scenario where more retailers compete with each other. Moreover, in our analysis we pursue simplicity of the theoretical model by imposing assumptions, such as the full information assumption, which may not be available in real applications. It would be interesting to investigate the powerbalanced Pareto-improved solution for general and realistic models, and our future work will be directed towards this avenue.
